

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-08 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05 CIAE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0688

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BUCHAREST 5019

LIMDIS

LONDON FOR SONNENFELDT

PARIS FOR HARTMAN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S VISIT

1. THIS MESSAGE IS MEANT AS BACKGROUND FOR  
SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VISIT TO ROMANIA NOVEMBER  
3-4. IN IT WE ASSESS THE PRESENT MOOD IN BUCHAREST  
AND DISCUSS LIKELY EVOLUTION OF ROMANIAN POLICY,  
BOTH IN THE LIGHT OF US INTERESTS.

2. THE SECRETARY WILL FIND IN CEAUSESCU NOT ONLY  
THAT SHREWD, OPTIMISTIC, PRAGMATIC AND SOMETIMES  
HUMOROUS CHIEF OF STATE WHOM HE LAST SAW ALMOST A  
YEAR AGO BUT AN INDIVIDUAL STILL MORE OBSESSED WITH  
THE PERSONAL MISSION OF LEADING ROMANIA'S HISTORIC  
LEAP TOWARD SECURE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, A MODERNIZED  
SOCIETY AND DEVELOPED COUNTRY STATUS BY 1990. THE NEW  
ROMANIAN PARTY PROGRAM SET FOR ENDORSEMENT AT THE  
11TH CONGRESS IN LATE NOVEMBER TYPIFIES CEAUSESCU'S  
ORIGINAL BLEND OF NATIONALISM, MARXISM AND POPULISM,  
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THE "ROMANIAN PATH TO SOCIALISM." NATIONALIST THROUGH

HE IS, HE IS AN AVID BELIEVER IN INTERDEPENDENCE AS WELL FOR HE IS BESET BY A SENSE OF ROMANIA'S INFERIORITY AS ONE OF THE LEAST DEVELOPED SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND HAS CONVINCED HIMSELF THAT ROMANIA CAN ACHIEVE HIS GOALS ONLY BY BECOMING A STILL MORE ACTIVE PARTICIPANT, NOT JUST IN EUROPE BUT IN THE WORLD. LIKE NO OTHER IN EASTERN EUROPE, CEAUSESCU'S ONE-MAN SYSTEM IS KEYED TO GOADING HIS COUNTRY THROUGH FORCED-DRAFT MODERNIZATION. SELF-AGGRANDIZEMENT, NATIONALISTIC DEFENSIVE MANEUVERS ABROAD AND MOBILIZATION AT HOME ARE ALL PRESENT IN HIS PERSONALITY CULT. SENSING HEAVY WEATHER AHEAD, HE HAS REPORTED INCREASINGLY TO THE FAMILIAR LEVERS OF PATRIOTISM, DISCIPLINE AND UNITY TO BRING IT ALL OFF. DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL OBSTACLES, CONSIDERING HIS SUCCESSFUL TRACK RECORD, ONE IS CHARY OF SECOND GUESSING THE CONTINUED APPLICABILITY OF HIS FORMULA FOR CARRYING ROMANIA THROUGH THE SHOALS OF POST-TITO BALKAN UNCERTAINTIES AND CONTINUING SOVIET PRESSURES.

3. NEVERTHELESS, HIS CULT HAS BEGUN TO FRAY; THERE IS MORE DOUBT AND DISCUSSION THAN BEFORE, THOUGH NOT UNMANAGEABLY SO. GROWTH FACES ROMANIA WITH NEW PROBLEMS NOT NECESSARILY SOLVABLE BY HORTATORY CAMPAIGNS AND CADRE RESHUFFLING. TECHNICIANS AND INTELLECTUALS ARE ALIENATED BY PREVAILING STRICTURES, AS THE CULT'S DRAWBACKS -- HERKY JERKY MANAGEMENT AND STIFLED INITIATIVE -- BECOME CLEARER. CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS ARE LARGELY UNMET. PLAN LAGS MAY GIVE CEAUSESCU'S PEERS MORE REASON TO QUESTION THE REALISM OF HIS DRIVE SINCE 1972 TO SQUEEZE EVEN HARDER FOR OVERFULFILLMENT. YET HIS CARDS ARE STILL STRONG: HE NOW HOLDS EVERY TOP OFFICE; HIS EGALITARIAN, NATIONALIST INSTINCTS STRIKE A RESPONSE AMONG ORDINARY AND MANY NOT SO ORDINARY ROMANIANS TO WHOM, EASILY LED, LONG-SUFFERING, RUSSIAN-FEARING, HE MUST LOOK VIRTUALLY INDISPENSABLE; HE HAS PROVED A MASTER AT SHIFTING BLAME AND NEUTRALIZING POTENTIAL OPPOSITION. COLDLY ASSESSED, THEN, CEAUSESCU STILL LOOKS TOUGH AND FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO HANDLE INTERNAL DISCONTENT

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WHILE IMPOSING HIS VISION OF ROMANIA'S FUTURE FOR SOME TIME YET, ALTHOUGH VULNERABILITIES WILL INCREASE.

4. LOOKING AHEAD IN FOREIGN POLICY, THE BASIC QUESTION IS: HAS ROMANIAN MOMENTUM EXHAUSTED ITSELF AGAINST LIMITS POSED BY SOVIET POWER? THE ANSWER IS NO. CLEARLY, AS OTHER EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES EXPAND THEIR OWN RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, ROMANIA'S PIONEER-

ING ROLE BECOMES SOMEWHAT LESS IMPRESSIVE, HER  
UNIQUELY INDEPENDENT COURSE IS LESS OBVIOUS TO THE  
WEST WHEN DRAMATIC JUMPS NO LONGER OCCUR. MOSCOW HAS  
SO FAR CONTAINED THE ROMANIAN DEVIATION FAIRLY WELL  
IN THE REST OF EASTERN EUROPE, AND EARLIER  
ROMANIAN POSITIONS HAVE BEEN SLIGHTLY MUTED. YET  
ROMANIA SHOWS NOT THE SLIGHTEST SIGN OF SOFTENING  
ITS FUNDAMENTAL ANTAGONISM TO MOSCOW'S IMPERIAL  
IMPULSES; CONTROLLED CONFLICT WILL LIKELY PREVAIL  
IN IDEOLOGICAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, WARSAW PACT  
AND CEMA MATTERS AS BUCHAREST FOLLOWS A "NO REAL  
CONFRONTATION, NO FUNDAMENTAL CONCESSION" POLICY UNDER  
COVER OF OUTWARDLY CORRECT RELATIONS. CEAUSESCU HAS  
FOUND THAT TAPPING WHAT SUPPORT HE COULD FROM THE  
U.S. AND CHINA FOR ROMANIA'S COURSE, JOINING THE WORLD  
MONETARY SYSTEM, AND STIMULATING TRADE AND INVESTMENT  
FROM THE WEST HAVE BEEN ALL VERY WELL BUT NO PANACEA.  
WITH ABOUT 50 PERCENT OF HER TRADE WITH THE WEST,  
ROMANIA IS MORE EXPOSED TO DIFFICULTIES MARKET  
ECONOMIES ARE EXPERIENCING THAN ARE LESS OPEN EE  
STATES. ITS LARGE CONVERTIBLE CURRENCY DEBT AND HIGH-  
COST CREDIT CRUNCH HURT BUT WITH ITS HIGHLY CENTRAL-  
IZED ECONOMY ROMANIA PROBABLY CAN WORK ITS WAY THROUGH

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ACTION SS-14

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FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0689

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BUCHAREST 5019

LIMDIS

LONDON FOR SONNENFELDT

PARIS FOR HARTMAN

THESE DIFFICULTIES. ALTHOUGH HE WILL BE UNABLE TO MOVE TOO MUCH CLOSER TO A YUGOSLAV-TYPE NON-ALIGNED SOCIALISM, CEAUSESCU WILL KEEP ON PUTTING STRONG EMPHASIS ON TIES WITH THE THIRD WORLD WHERE HE HAS BEEN SO ACTIVE THAT HE SOUNDS SOMETIMES MORE LIKE A NON-ALIGNED THAN WARSAW PACT LEADER (MEANWHILE SEEKING MARKETS, RAW MATERIALS AND POLITICAL SUPPORT, ALL BY WAY OF EXPLORING EVERY POSSIBILITY TO PUSH DEVELOPMENT AND ENHANCE THEREBY ROMANIA'S INDEPENDENCE.)

5. THE PRESENT US-ROMANIAN RELATIONSHIP IS HEALTHY ENOUGH. TRADE IS AN OBVIOUS INDICATOR. FROM SIXTH PLACE AMONG ROMANIA'S TRADING PARTNERS IN 1972, THE US IS COMING UP FAST ON THIRD AND BOTH SIDES AIM FOR ONE BILLION DOLLARS IN BILATERAL TRADE BY 1980. DESPITE OCCASIONAL PROBLEMS, CONTACTS ARE EXTENSIVE AND INCREASING IN MANY FIELDS AND NEW ROMANIAN IDEAS (LIKE THE ASTRONAUT PROPOSAL) ARE RARELY LACKING. YET OLD SUSPICIONS OF US GREAT-POWER  
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REFLEXES AND TACIT COLLUSION WITH THE SOVIETS ON SPHERES OF INFLUENCE NEVER SEEM ENTIRELY ALLAYED. FOR EXAMPLE, RECENT PRESS ARTICLES DECRYING "HOLY ALLIANCE DETENTE" AND INTERFERENCE IN SMALLER STATES SEEM TO REFER TO WHAT IS CONSIDERED US OVER-EMPHASIS ON DETENTE'S SOVIET COMPONENT AND DEFENSE OF CIA ACTIONS IN CHILE. THE SPECIAL NIXON-CEAUSESCU AURA IS PROBABLY UNRECAPTUREABLE BUT BASING RELATIONS INCREASINGLY ON A WEB OF INSTITUTIONALIZED AND COMMON INTERESTS WILL HAVE ITS OWN STRENGTHS.

6. WHAT WILL A HEALTHY ROMANIA BE WORTH TO US FOR THE REST OF THE DECADE? DIVIDENDS INCLUDE (1) HELPING KEEP THE SOVIETS HONEST -- NO OTHER EE COUNTRY IS AS READY TO SPOKE THE SOVIETS' WHEELS IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, WARSAW PACT OR CEMA; ROMANIAN OBDURACY HAS FREQUENTLY OBLIGED MOSCOW TO SEEK COMPROMISE IN THE PAST, AND ESPECIALLY WHEN TROUBLES BESET THE WEST, INDEPENDENT VOICES IN THE OPPOSITE CAMP ARE USEFUL. (2) A GOOD EXAMPLE OF DETENTE IN EUROPE ON THE SOVIET FRONTIER AND OF MUTUALLY USEFUL INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN SMALL AND LARGE COUNTRIES WITH DIFFERENT SYSTEMS BUT SHARED CONCERNS. (3) BALKAN STABILITY -- ESPECIALLY AFTER TITO EXPIRES, ROMANIAN SUPPORT FOR YUGOSLAVIA AND REFUSAL TO EXPAND WARSAW

PACT/CEMA INTEGRATION ARE A HEDGE AGAINST A PAX SOVIETICA IN THE REGION. (4) CONTINUED ROLE AS INNOVATOR IN EASTERN EUROPE AND BEYOND -- PARTICULARLY IF SOVIET BEHAVIOR IS CONSTRAINED AND DETENTE'S COURSE ALLOWS ROMANIA TO RELAX A BIT MORE. EVEN ROMANIAN COURTSHIP OF THE THIRD WORLD SOMETIMES CAN BE A MODERATING INFLUENCE ON THE RADICAL NON-ALIGNED, AS A PARTISAN OF DIVERSITY AND PEACEFUL COOPERATION, AND USEFUL BROKER WHOSE INTEREST IN CALMING LOCAL FLAREUPS OFTEN COINCIDES WITH OURS.

7. THESE DIVIDENDS COME AT MODEST COST. ROMANIANS CAN REALISTICALLY EXPECT NOT MUCH MORE FROM THE U.S. THAN CONTINUATION OF BENEVOLENT BUT LIMITED ACTIONS AS DURING THESE PAST FIVE YEARS - PERIODIC HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT, EVENTUAL MFN, COMMERCIAL ENCOURAGEMENT, CONFIDENTIAL

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RESPECT FOR ROMANIAN INTERESTS IN HOW WE TALK ABOUT AND HANDLE DETENTE, AND OCCASIONAL CREDIT FAVORS. AT SUCH A LEVEL, OUR RELATIONS WITH THE USSR ARE LEFT UNAFFECTED; MOSCOW CURRENTLY ACTS AS IF THE ROMANIAN IRRITANT IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROVOCATIVE TO REQUIRE MORE THAN A WAITING GAME -- YET THE U.S. CONNECTION IS VISIBLE AND TANGIBLE ENOUGH TO ADD, IN BUCHAREST'S VIEW, A NEEDED ELEMENT OF DETERRENCE AGAINST THE EVENTUALITY OF MORE AGGRESSIVE SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND OF PARTICIPATION IN ROMANIA'S AMBITIOUS GOALS. BARNES

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